Two roads diverged in a wood, and I
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Since Frost's language often does not overtly signal that the poem is to be taken metaphorically, incompetent English teachers occasionally teach Frost as if he were a nature poet, simply describing scenes. (I have actually had students whose high school teachers taught them that!) Thus, this passage could be read nonmetaphorically as being just about a trip on which one encounters a crossroads. There is nothing in the sentences themselves that forces one to a metaphorical interpretation. But, since it is about travel and encountering crossroads, it evokes a knowledge of journeys. This activates the system of conventional metaphor we have just discussed, in which longterm, purposeful activities are understood as journeys, and further, how life and careers can also be understood as one-person journeys (love relationships, involving two travelers, are ruled out here). The poem is typically taken as being about life and a choice of life goals, though it might also be interpreted as being about careers and careers paths, or about some longterm, purposeful activity. All that is needed to get the requisite range of interpretations is the structure of conventional metaphors discussed above, and the knowledge structure evoked by the poem. The conventional mapping will apply to the knowledge structure yielding the appropriate inferences. No special mechanisms are needed.

The conceptual system underlying a language contains thousands of conceptual metaphors -- conventional mappings from one domain to another, such as the Event Structure Metaphor. The novel metaphors of a language are, except for image metaphors, extensions of this large conventional system. Perhaps the deepest question that any theory of metaphor must answer is this: Why do we have the conventional metaphors that we have? Or alternatively: Is there any reason why conceptual systems contain one set of metaphorical mappings rather than another? There do appear to be answers to these questions for many of the mappings found so far, though they are in the realm of plausible accounts, rather than in the realm of scientific results. Take a simple case: the MORE IS UP metaphor, as seen in expressions like: Prices rose. His income went down. Unemployment is up. Exports are down. The number of homeless people is very high. There are other languages in which MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN, but none in which the reverse is true, where MORE IS DOWN and LESS IS UP. Why not? The answer given in the contemporary theory is that the MORE IS UP metaphor is grounded in experience-in the common experiences of pouring more fluid into a container and seeing the level go up, or adding more things to a pile and seeing the pile get higher. These are thoroughly pervasive experiences; we experience them every day of our lives. They are experiences with a structure-a correspondence between the conceptual domain of quantity and the conceptual domain of verticality: MORE corresponds in such experiences to UP and LESS corresponds to DOWN. These correspondences in real experience form the basis for the correspondence in the metaphorical cases, which go beyond the cases in real experience: in Prices rose there is no correspondence in real experience between quantity and verticality, but understanding quantity in terms of verticality makes sense because of the existence of a regular correspondence in so many other cases. Consider another case: What is the basis of the widespread KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor, as in expressions like: I see what your saying. His answer was clear. This paragraph is murky. He was so blinded by ambition that he never noticed his limitations. The experiential basis, in this case, is the fact that most of what we know comes through vision, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases, if we see something, then we know it is true. Consider still another case: Why, in the Event Structure Metaphor, is achieving a purpose understood as reaching a destination (in the location subsystem) and as acquiring a desired object (in the object subsystem)? The answer again seems to be correspondences in everyday experience. To achieve most of our everyday purposes, we either have to move to some destination or acquire some object. If you want a drink of water, you've got to go to the water fountain. If you want to be in the sunshine, you have to move to where the sunshine is. And if you want to write down a note, you got to get a pen or pencil. The correspondences between achieving purposes and either reaching destinations or acquiring objects is so utterly common in our everyday existence, that the resulting metaphor is completely natural. But what about the experiential basis of A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY? Recall that that mapping is in an inheritance hierarchy, where life goals are special cases of purposes, which are destinations in the event structure metaphor. Thus, A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY inherits the experiential basis of PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. Thus, inheritance hierarchies provide indirect experiential bases, in that a metaphorical mapping lower in a hierarchy can inherit its experiential basis indirectly from a mapping higher in the hierarchy. Experiential bases motivate metaphors, they do not predict them. Thus, not every language has a MORE IS UP metaphor, though all human beings experience a correspondence between MORE and UP in their experience. What this experiential basis does predict is that no language will have the opposite metaphor LESS IS UP. It also predicts that a speaker of language that does not have that metaphor will be able to learn that metaphor much more easily than the opposite metaphor.

Consider objects like thermometers and stock market graphs, where increases in temperature and prices are represented as being up and decreases as being down. These are real man-made objects created to accord with the MORE IS UP metaphor. They are objects in which there is a correlation between MORE and UP. Such objects are a lot easier to read and understand than if they contradicted the metaphor, say, if increases were represented as down and decreases as up. Such objects are ways in which metaphors impose a structure on real life, through the creation of new correspondences in experience. And of course, once such real objects are created in one generation, those objects serve as an experiential basis for that metaphor in the next generation. There are a great many ways in which conventional metaphors can be made real. Metaphors can be realized in obvious imaginative products such as cartoons, literary works, dreams, visions, and myths. But metaphors can be made real in less obvious ways as well, in physical symptoms, social institutions, social practices, laws, and even foreign policy and forms of discourse and of history. Let us consider some examples:

Cartoons:

Conventional metaphors are made real in cartoons. A common example is the realization of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, in which one can be boiling mad or letting off steam. In cartoons, anger is commonly depicted by having steam coming out the character's ears. Similarly, social clumsiness is indicated by having a cartoon character fall on his face.

Literary works:

It is common for the plot of novel to be a realization of the PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, where the course of a life takes the form of an actual journey. Pilgrim's Progress is a classical example.

Rituals:

Consider the cultural ritual in which a newborn baby is carried upstairs to insure his or her success. The metaphor realized in this ritual is STATUS IS UP, exemplified by sentences such as: He clawed his way to the top. He climbed the ladder of success. You'll rise in the world.

Dream Interpretation:

Conceptual metaphors consitute the vocabulary of dream interpretation. It is the collection of our everyday conceptual metaphors that make dream interpretations possible. Consider one of the most celebrated of all dream interpretations: Joseph's interpretation of Pharoah's dream from Genesis. In Pharoah's dream, he is standing on the river bank, when seven fat cows come out of the river, followed by seven lean cows that eat the seven fat ones and still remain lean. Then Pharoah dreams again. This time he sees seven full and good ears of corn growing, and then seven withered ears growing after them. The withered ears devour the good ears. Joseph interprets the two dreams as a single dream. The seven fat cows and full ears are good years and the seven lean cows and withered ears are famine years that follow the good years. The famine years devour what the good years produce. This interpretation makes sense to us because of a collection of conceptual metaphors in our conceptual system -- metaphors that have been with us since Biblical times.

• The first metaphor used is: TIMES ARE MOVING ENTITIES. A river is a common metaphor for the flow of time; the cows are individual entities (years) emerging from the flow of time and moving past the observer; the ears of corn are also entities that come into the scene.

• The second metaphor used is ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS EATING, where being fat indicates success being lean indicates failure. This metaphor is combined with the most common of metonymies: A PART STANDS FOR THE WHOLE. Since cows and corn were typical of meat and grain eaten, each single cow stands for all the cows raised in a year and each ear of corn for all the corn grown in a year.

• The final metaphor used is: RESOURCES ARE FOOD, where using up resources is eating food. The devouring of the good years by the famine years is interpreted as indicating that all the surplus resources of the good years will be used up by the famine years.

The interpretation of the whole dream is thus a composition of three conventional metaphors and one metonymy. The metaphoric and metonymic sources are combined to form the reality of the dream.

Myths:

In the Event Structure metaphor, there is a submapping EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE, MOVING OBJECTS that can exerted a force upon you and thereby effect whether you achieve your goals. In English the special cases of such objects are things, fluids, and horses. Pamela Morgan (in unpublished work) has observed that in Greek Mythology, Poseidon is the god of the sea, earthquakes, horses and bulls. The list might seem arbitrary, but Morgan observes that these are all large moving objects that can exert a force on you. Morgan surmises that this is not an obvious list. The sea, earthquakes, horses, and bulls are all large moving objects that can exert a significant force. Poseidon, she surmises, should really be seen as the god of external events.

Physical symptoms:

The unconscious mind makes use our unconscious system of conventional metaphor, sometimes to express psychological states in terms of physical symptoms. For example, in the Event Structure metaphor, there is a submapping DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION which has, as a special case, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS. It is fairly common for someone encountering difficulties to walk with his shoulders stooped, as if carrying a heavy weight that is burdening him.

Social institutions:

We have a TIME IS MONEY metaphor, shown by expressions like:

He's wasting time.

I have to budget my time.

This will save you time.

I've invested a lot of time in that.

He doesn't use his time profitably.

This metaphor came into English about the time of the industrial revolution, when people started to be paid for work by the amount of time they worked. Thus, the factory led to the institutional pairing of periods of time with amounts of money, which formed the experiential basis of this metaphor. Since then, the metaphor has been realized in many other ways. The budgeting of time has spread throughout American culture.

Social practices:

There is conceptual metaphor that SEEING IS TOUCHING, where the eyes are limbs and vision is achieved when the object seen is touched.

Examples are:

My eyes picked out every detail of the pattern.

He ran his eyes over the walls.

He couldn't take his eyes off of her.

Their eyes met.

His eyes are glued to the tv.

The metaphor is made real in the social practice of avoiding eye contact on the street, and in the social prohibition against undressing someone with your eyes.

Laws:

Law is major area where metaphor is made real. For example, CORPORATIONS ARE PERSONS is a tenet of American law, which not only enables corporations to be harmed and assigned responsibility so that they can be sued when liable, but also gives corporations certain First Amendment rights.

Foreign policy:

A STATE IS A PERSON is one of the major metaphors underlying foreign policy concepts. Thus, there are friendly states, hostile states, etc. Health for a state is economic health and strength is military strength. Thus a threat to economic health can be seen as a death threat, as when Iraq was seen to have a stanglehold on the economic lifeline of the U.S. Strong states are seen as male, and weak states as female, so that an attack by a strong state on a weak state can be seen as a rape, as in the rape of Kuwait by Iraq. A just war is conceptualized as a fairy tale with villain, victim, and hero, where the villain attacks the victim and the hero rescues the victim. Thus, the U.S. in the Gulf War was portrayed as having rescued Kuwait. As President Bush said in his address to Congress, The issues couldn't have been clearer: Iraq was the villain and Kuwait, the victim.

Forms of discourse:

Common metaphors are often made real in discourse forms. Consider four common academic discourse forms: the Guided Tour, the Heroic Battle, and the Heroic Quest.

The Guided Tour is based on the metaphor that THOUGHT IS MOTION, where ideas are locations and one reasons step-by-step, reaches conclusions, or you fail to reach a conclusion if you are engaged in circular reasoning. Communication in this metaphor is giving someone a guided tour of some rational argument or of some intellectual terrain. The present paper is an example of such a guided tour, where I, the author, am the tour guide who is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the terrain, and where the terrain surveyed is taken as objectively real.

The discourse form of the Heroic Battle is based on the metaphor that ARGUMENT IS WAR. The author's theory is the hero, the opposing theory is the villain, and words are weapons. The battle is in the form of an argument defending the hero's position and demolishing the villain's position.

The Heroic Quest discourse form is based on the metaphor that knowledge is a valuable but elusive object that can be discovered if one perseveres. The scientist is the hero on a quest for knowledge, and the discourse form is an account of his difficult journey of discovery. What is discovered is, of course, a real entity. What makes all of these cases realizations of metaphors is that in each case there is something real structured by conventional metaphor, and which is made comprehensible, or even natural, by those everyday metaphors. What is real differs in each case: an object like a thermometer or graph, an experience like a dream, an action like a ritual, a form of discourse, etc.

What these examples reveal is that a lot of what is real in a society or in the experience of an individual is structured and made sense of via conventional metaphor. Experiential bases and realizations of metaphors are two sides of the same coin: they are both correlations in real experience that have the same structure as the correlations in metaphors. The difference is that experiential bases precede, ground, and make sense of conventional metaphorical mappings, while realizations follow, and are made sense of, via the conventional metaphors. And as we noted above, one generation's realizations of a metaphor can become part of the next generation's experiential basis for that metaphor.

As we have seen, the contemporary theory of metaphor is revolutionary in many respects. To give you some idea how revolutionary, here is a list of the basic results that differ from most previous accounts.

• Metaphor is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning.
• Much subject matter, from the most mundane to the most abstruse scientific theories, can only be comprehended via metaphor.
• Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic, in nature.
• Metaphorical language is a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor.
• Though much of our conceptual system is metaphorical, a significant part of it is nonmetaphorical. Metaphorical understanding is grounded in nonmetaphorical understanding.
• Metaphor allows us to understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more concrete, or at least a more highly structured subject matter.

• Metaphors are mappings across conceptual domains.
• Such mappings are asymmetric and partial.
• Each mapping is a fixed set of ontological correspondences between entities in a source domain and entities in a target domain.
• When those fixed correspondences are activated, mappings can project source domain inference patterns onto target domain inference patterns.
• Metaphorical mappings obey the Invariance Principle: The image-schema structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain in a way that is consistent with inherent target domain structure.
• Mappings are not arbitrary, but grounded in the body and in everyday experience and knowledge.
• A conceptual system contains thousands of conventional metaphorical mappings, which form a highly structured subsystem of the conceptual system.
• There are two types of mappings: conceptual mappings and image- mappings; both obey the Invariance Principle.

• The system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious, automatic, and is used with no noticeable effort, just like our linguistic system and the rest of our conceptual system.
• Our system of conventional metaphor is alive in the same sense that our system of grammatical and phonological rules is alive; namely, it is constantly in use, automatically and below the level of consciousness.
• Our metaphor system is central to our understanding of experience and to the way we act on that understanding.
• Conventional mappings are static correspondences, and are not, in themselves, algorithmic in nature. However, this by no means rules out the possibility that such static correspondences might be used in language processing that involves sequential steps.
• Metaphor is mostly based on correspondences in our experiences, rather than on similarity.
• The metaphor system plays a major role in both the grammar and lexicon of a language.
• Metaphorical mappings vary in universality; some seem to be universal, others are widespread, and some seem to be culture- specific.
• Poetic metaphor is, for the most part, an extension of our everyday, conventional system of metaphorical thought.

These are the conclusions that best fit the empirical studies of metaphor conducted over the past decade or so. Though much of it is inconsistent with traditional views, it is by no means all new, and some ideas-e.g., that abstract concepts are comprehended in terms of concrete concepts-have a long history.

The evidence supporting the contemporary theory of metaphor is voluminous and grows larger each year as more research in the field is done. The evidence, as we saw above, comes from five domains:

• Generalizations over polysemy
• Generalization over inference patterns
• Generalizations over extensions to poetic cases
• Generalizations over semantic change
• Psycholinguistic experiments

I have discussed only a handful of examples of the first three of these, hopefully enough to make the reader curious about the field. But evidence is convincing only if it can count as evidence. When does evidence fail to be evidence? Unfortunately, all too often. It is commonly the case that certain fields of inquiry are defined by assumptions that rule out the possibility of counterevidence. When a defining assumption of a field comes up against evidence, the evidence usually loses: the practitioners of the field must ignore the evidence if they want to keep the assumptions that define the field they are committed to. Part of what makes the contemporary theory of metaphor so interesting is that the evidence for it contradicts the defining assumptions of so many academic disciplines. In my opinion, this should make one doubt the defining assumptions of all those disciplines. The reason is this: The defining assumptions of the contemporary theory of metaphor are minimal. There are only two. The Generalization Commitment: To seek generalizations in all areas of language, including polysemy, patterns of inference, novel metaphor, and semantic change. The Cognitive Commitment: To take experimental evidence seriously. But these are nothing more than commitments to the scientific study of language and the mind. No initial commitment is made as to the form of an answer to the question of what is metaphor. However, the defining assumptions of other fields do often entail a commitment about the form of an answer to that question. It is useful, in an interdisciplinary volume of this sort, to spell out exactly what those defining assumptions are, since they will often explain why different authors reach such different conclusions about the nature of metaphor.

I started this Chapter with a list of the false assumptions about literal meaning that are commonly made. These assumptions are, of course, false only relative to the kinds of evidence that supports the contemporary theory of metaphor. If one ignores all such evidence, then the assumptions can be maintained without contradiction. Assumptions about literality are the locus of many of the contradictions between the contemporary theory of metaphor and various academic disciplines. Let us review those assumptions. In the discussion of literal meaning given above, I observed that it is taken as definitional that: What is literal is not metaphorical. The false assumptions and conclusions that usually accompany the word literal are:

• All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical.
• All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor.
• Only literal language can be contingently true or false.
• All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not metaphorical.
• The concepts used in the grammar of a language are all literal; none are metaphorical.

We will begin with the philosophy of language. The Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment are not definitional to the philosophy of language. Indeed, most philosophers of language would feel no need to abide by them, for a very good reason. The philosophy of language is typically not seen as an empirical discipline, constrained by empirical results, such as those that arise by the application of the Generalization and Cognitive Commitments. Instead, the philosophy of language is usually seen as an a priori discipline, one which can be pursued using the tools of philosophical analysis alone, rather than the tools of empirical research. Therefore, all the evidence that has been brought forth for the contemporary theory of metaphor simply will not matter for most philosophers of language. In addition, the philosophy of language comes with its own set of defining assumptions, which entail many of the false assumptions usually associated with the word literal. Most practitioners of the philosophy of language usually make one or more of the following assumptions.

• The correspondence theory of truth.
• Meaning is defined in terms of reference and truth.
• Natural language semantics is to be characterized by the mechanisms of mathematical logic, including model theory.

These assumptions entail the traditional false assumptions associated with the word literal. Thus the very field of philosophy of language comes with defining assumptions that contradict the main conclusions of the contemporary theory of metaphor. Consequently, we can see why most philosophers of language have the range of views on metaphor that they have: They accept the traditional literal-figurative distinction. They may, like Davidson (1981), say that there is no metaphorical meaning, and that most metaphorical utterances are either trivially true or trivially false. Or, like Grice (1989, p. 34) and Searle (this volume), they will assume that metaphor is in the realm of pragmatics, that is, that a metaphorical meaning is no more than the literal meaning of some other sentence which can be arrived at by some pragmatic principle. This is required, since the only real meaning for them is literal meaning, and pragmatic principles are those principles that allow one to say one thing (with a literal meaning) and mean something else (with a different, but nonetheless literal, meaning). Much of generative linguistics accepts one or more of these assumptions from the philosophy of language. The field of formal semantics accepts them all, and thus formal semantics, by its defining assumptions, is at odds with the contemporary theory of metaphor. Formal semantics simply does not see it as its job> to account for the generalizations discussed in this paper. From the perspective of formal semantics, the phenomena that the contemporary theory of metaphor is concerned with are either nonexistent or uninteresting, since they lie outside the purview of the discipline. That is why Jerrold Sadock in his chapter in this volume claims that metaphor lies outside of synchronic linguistics. Since he accepts mathematical logic as the correct approach to natural language semantics, Sadock must see metaphor as being outside of semantics proper. He must, therefore, also reject the entire enterprise of the contemporary theory of metaphor. And Morgan (this volume), also accepting those defining assumptions of the philosophy of language, agrees with Grice and Searle that metaphor is a matter of pragmatics.

Chomsky's theory of government and binding also accepts crucial assumptions from the philosophy of language that are inconsistent with the contemporary theory of metaphor. Government and binding, following my early theory of generative semantics, assumes that semantics is to be represented in terms of logical form. Government and binding, like generative semantics, thus rules out the very possibility that metaphor might be part of natural language semantics as it enters into grammar. Because of this defining assumption, I would not expect government and binding theorists to become concerned with the phenomena covered by the contemporary theory of metaphor.

Interestingly, much of continental philosophy and deconstructionism is also characterized by defining assumptions that are at odds with the contemporary theory of metaphor. Nietzsche (see, Johnson, 1981) held that all language is metaphorical, which is at odds with those results that indicate that a significant amount of everyday language is not metaphorical. Much of continental philosophy, observing that conceptual systems change through time, assumes that conceptual systems are purely historically contingent-that there are no conceptual universals. Though conceptual systems do change through time, there do, however, appear to be universal, or at least very widespread, conceptual metaphors. The event structure metaphor is my present candidate for a metaphorical universal. Continental philosophy also comes with a distinction between the study of the physical world, which can be scientific, and the study of human beings, which it says cannot be scientific. This is very much at odds with the conceptual theory of metaphor, which is very much a scientific enterprise.

Finally, the contemporary theory of metaphor is at odds with certain traditions in symbolic artificial intelligence and information processing psychology. Those fields assume that thought is a matter of algorithmic symbol manipulation, of the sort done by a traditional computer program. This defining assumption puts it at odds with the contemporary theory of metaphor in two respects: First, the contemporary theory has an image-schematic basis: The invariance hypothesis applies both to image-metaphors and characterizes constraints on novel metaphor. Since symbol-manipulation systems cannot handle image-schemas, they cannot deal with image-metaphors or imagable idioms. Second, those traditions must characterize metaphorical mapping as an algorithmic process, which typically takes literal meanings as input and gives a metaphorical reading as output. This is at odds with cases where there are multiple, overlapping metaphors in a single sentence, and which require the simultaneous activation of a number of metaphorical mappings.

The contemporary theory of metaphor is thus not only interesting for its own sake. It is especially interesting for the challenge it brings to other disciplines. For, if the results of the contemporary theory are accepted, then the defining assumptions of whole disciplines are brought into question.

This research was supported in part by grants from the Sloan Foundation and the National Science Foundation (IRI-8703202) to the University of California at Berkeley. The following colleagues and students helped with this paper in a variety of ways, from useful comments to allowing me to cite their research: Ken Baldwin, Claudia Brugman, Jane Espenson, Sharon Fischler, Ray Gibbs, Adele Goldberg, Mark Johnson, Karin Myhre, Eve Sweetser, and Mark Turner.

Most of the papers in this edition also appeared in the first edition of 1979 and thus predate the contemporary theory of metaphor. Because of this, I thought might be a service to readers to provide a short annotated bibliography of fundamental books and papers on the contemporary theory written since the first edition of this volume appeared.

Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. 1990. Psycholinguistic studies on the conceptual basis of idiomaticity. Cognitive Linguistics, 1-4: 417-462.

A survey of psycholinguistic results demonstrating the cognitive reality of conceptual metaphor and imagable idioms.

Johnson, Mark. 1981. Philosphical Perspectives on Metaphor Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

The best collection of papers by philosophers on metaphor. Thae author's introduction is the best short historical survey of the history of metaphor in philsophy.

Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: the Bodily Basis of Meaning, Reason and Imagination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A discussion of philosophical issues arising from the discovery of the system of conceptual metaphor.

Kovecses, Zoltan. 1990. Emotion Concepts. Springer-Verlag.

A thorough and voluminously documented demonstration that emotion is conceptualized metaphorically.

Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A survey of contemporary literature on categorization, including the role of metaphor in forming categories categories. Includes a general theory of meaning assimilating conceptual metaphor and other aspects of cognitive semantics.

Lakoff, George. 1989. Philosophical Speculation and Cognitive Science. In Philosophical Psychology: 2,1.

A discussion of the differing assumptions behind generative semantics and generative grammar.

Lakoff, George. 1991. Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used To Justify War in the Gulf.

Distributed via electronic bulletin boards, January, 1991. Reprinted in Brien Hallet (ed.), Engulfed in War: Just War and the Persian Gulf, Honolulu: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1991. Also in: Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1991. Also in: Vietnam Generation Newsletter, vol. 3, no. 2, No vember 1991. Also in: The East Bay Express, February, 1991. An analysis of the metaphorical system used in the public discourse and expert policy deliberations on the Gulf War, together with what the metaphors hid, and a critique of the war based on this analysis.

Lakoff, George and Claudia Brugman. 1986. Argument Forms in Lexical Semantics. In Nikiforidou et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: 442-454.

A survey of the argument forms used in justifying metaphorical analysis and a comparison with corresponding argument forms in syntax and phonology.

Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The first book outlining the con temporary theory of metaphor.

Lakoff, George and Turner, Mark. 1989. More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A survey of the mechanisms of poetic metaphor, replete with examples.

Sweetser, Eve. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: The Mind-as-Body Metaphor in Semantic Structure and Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer sity Press.

The best work to date on the role of metaphor in semantic change, and the metaphorical basis of pragmatics.

Talmy, Leonard. 1985. Force Dynamics in Language and Thought. In Papers from the Parasession on Causatives and Agentivity. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

The analysis that led to the study of the metaphorical basis of modality and causation.

Turner, Mark. 1987. Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A study of the regularities behind all the kinship metaphors from Chaucer to Wallace Stevens, including the role of metaphor in allegory. Turner also noticed the prevalence of the CAUSATION IS PROGENERATION metaphor and the constraint that was the precursor to the Invariance Principle.

Turner, Mark 1991. Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A reevaluation of the profession of English and the study of the English language in the light of recent results on the nature of metaphor and other results in the cognitive sciences.

Winter, Steven L. 1989. Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 University of Pennsylvania Law Review.

The most comprehensive of Winter's many articles discussing the role of metaphor in law.

• Auster, Paul, ed. 1984. The Random House Book of Twentieth Century French Poetry. New York: Random House.
• Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. 1990. Psycholinguistics studies on the conceptual basis of idiomaticity. Cognitive Linguistics, 1-4: 417-462.
• Grice, Paul 1989. Studies in the Way of Words Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Johnson, Mark. 1981. Philosphical Perspectives on Metaphor Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: the Bodily Basis of Meaning, Reason and Imagination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Kovecses, Zoltan. 1990. Emotion Concepts. Springer- Verlag.
• Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Lakoff, George. 1989. Philosophical Speculation and Cognitive Science. In Philosophical Psychology: 2,1.
• Lakoff, George and Claudia Brugman. 1986. Argument Forms in Lexical Semantics. In Nikiforidou et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: 442-454.
• Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Lakoff, George and Turner, Mark. 1989. More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merwin, W. S. 1973. Asian Figures. New York: Atheneum.
• Merwin, W. S., and Masson, J. Moussaieff, trs. 1981. The Peacock's Egg. San Francisco: North Point Press.
• Rothenberg, Jerome, ed. 1985. Technicians of the Sacred. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Sweetser, Eve. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: The Mind-as-Body Metaphor in Semantic Structure and Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Talmy, Leonard. 1985. Force Dynamics in Language and Thought. In Papers from the Parasession on Causatives and Agentivity. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
• Turner, Mark. 1987. Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Turner, Mark 1991. Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.